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	Many believe that we are not morally responsible for what we cannot help doing. Call this ‘the Traditional View of Responsible Agency.’ Some forty years ago, Harry Frankfurt (1969) challenged this view, thereby initiating a new stage of the free-will debate. In contrast to the previous stage, in which debate centered on how best to accommodate the Traditional View, contemporary theorists have focused on whether this view should be accepted at all. If the link between moral responsibility and avoidability is severed, an important threat to compatibilism is neutralized.​[2]​
In the wake of Frankfurt’s challenge, a tremendous literature has sprung up, with many ingenious responses matched by equally thoughtful extensions of Frankfurt’s original argument. Quite recently, an altogether new line of response has been proposed. This new approach, versions of which have been advanced by Maria Alvarez (2009) and Helen Steward (2009), attempts to support the Traditional View indirectly, by appealing to the conditions for action, rather than to the conditions for moral responsibility per se. The leading idea is that it’s essential to something’s status as an action that the agent be able to refrain from performing it. Call the view that actions (conceptually) must be avoidable ‘the Avoidability Thesis about Action.’ If this thesis is correct, it’s never the case that someone is morally responsible for an unavoidable action, since there is nothing to be morally responsible for when a piece of behavior is unavoidable. In so far as Frankfurt’s challenge depends on showing that someone can be morally responsible for the very same action (= act-token) she is unable to avoid, the Avoidability Thesis, if correct, seems to bring this challenge up short.
Indeed, by contesting the idea that actions can be unavoidable, this response takes aim at a supposition that all “Frankfurt cases” (the name for Frankfurt-inspired counterexamples to the Traditional View) seem to share. In this respect, it goes beyond many previous objections, which are directed against particular developments of the counterexample strategy. If successful, this response may well reveal a fundamental difficulty for Frankfurt’s strategy, one that cannot be resolved through further modifications of the cases; thus defenders of this strategy cannot safely ignore this response.
Here I argue that this response won’t help incompatibilist proponents of the Traditional View. This is because these philosophers seek to defend the Traditional View as a premise of the Traditional Argument for Incompatibilism. According to the Traditional Argument, we are morally responsible only for what we are able to avoid (the Traditional View), and we are unable to avoid anything we are deterministically caused to do. If appealing to the Avoidability Thesis preserves the Traditional View at the expense of the Traditional Argument, the result will be a hollow victory for incompatibilists. I shall argue that this appeal yields precisely such a hollow victory. Since incompatibilists who remain loyal to the Traditional Argument have a particularly clear stake in meeting Frankfurt’s challenge, it is significant that the new response isn’t available to them.
But why think that incompatibilists can’t appeal to the Avoidability Thesis in a combined defense of the Traditional View and the Traditional Argument? After all, Frankfurt’s challenge purports to undermine the Traditional Argument by disproving the Traditional View, a premise of that argument. It would seem, then, that countering Frankfurt’s challenge to the Traditional View should also constitute a defense of the Traditional Argument. As I hope to show, things are not so simple. Even if we grant for argument’s sake that appealing to the Avoidability Thesis answers Frankfurt’s challenge to the Traditional View, this response cannot be parlayed into a promising defense of the Traditional Argument. To see this, we may begin by putting this question to incompatibilists who endorse the Avoidability Thesis: “Are actions that originate deterministically ipso facto unavoidable?” If they answer “yes,” they find themselves on the first horn of a dilemma. For if every such behavior is unavoidable, and if no action is unavoidable, it follows that nobody has ever done anything if determinism is true; in short, determinism turns out to be incompatible with action. And, I argue, this consequence proves to be unacceptable.
If, on the other hand, they answer “no,” these incompatibilists encounter the dilemma’s other horn. For if causally determined actions are avoidable, why think that we can’t be morally responsible for them? In short, allowing that causally determined actions are avoidable (and thus abandoning the Traditional Argument’s other premise, namely that we are unable to avoid what we are deterministically caused to do), is just as damaging to the Traditional Argument as abandoning the Traditional View would be. Whichever way these theorists come down on the above question, then, they will have saved the Traditional View at the expense of the Traditional Argument.​[3]​
In section 2 below, I argue that Steward’s approach succumbs to the first horn of the dilemma, implying that we never act if determinism is true. In section 3, I argue that incompatibilists who adopt Alvarez’s approach encounter the dilemma’s second horn, conceding that causally determined actions are avoidable.
Of course, even if this dilemma shows that defenders of the Traditional Argument cannot appeal to the Avoidability Thesis, it is a further question whether this response is open to compatibilist defenders of the Traditional View.​[4]​ I won’t take up this further question here. Showing that this response is unavailable to incompatibilists is significant, given the clear interest that the Traditional Argument’s defenders have in meeting Frankfurt’s challenge.
As noted, the Steward-Alvarez strategy is significant for two reasons. First, it challenges a presupposition common to all Frankfurt cases, namely that unavoidable action is possible. Second, it bases this challenge on a claim about the conditions for action as such. In light of this claim, the Steward-Alvarez strategy has clear implications for action theory, quite apart from its significance for the debate over Frankfurt’s counterexample strategy. I do not believe that the Avoidability Thesis should be accepted. Instead of challenging it directly, however, I examine it in conjunction with the claim that causally determined actions are unavoidable, concluding that the resulting view—that causally determined actions are less than genuine or full-blown actions—should be rejected.
 
2.	Steward and the Dilemma’s First Horn
Frankfurt’s challenge to the Traditional View targeted what he called ‘the Principle of Alternate Possibilities’ (1969, 829):

(PAP)	Someone is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.

To disprove PAP, Frankfurt presented this scenario (835-36):

Suppose [Black] wants Jones to perform a certain action. [Black] is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones is going to decide to do something other than what he wants him to do. If it does become clear that Jones is going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him to do. Whatever Jones’ initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black will have his way....
...Now suppose Black never has to show his hand because Jones, for reasons of his own, decides to perform and does perform the very action Black wants him to perform.

Since Black makes no actual causal contribution to Jones’s action, Frankfurt’s conclusion—that Black’s presence doesn’t affect Jones’s moral responsibility for that action—seems highly plausible. In effect, Black’s counterfactual intervention merely “filters out” alternative pathways into the future; it does nothing to “push” Jones down the path he actually takes. If such cases are possible, and if PAP should be rejected in light of them, then either the Traditional View must be rejected with it, or a replacement principle—one that preserves PAP’s spirit while surviving Frankfurt-style counterexamples—must be found.
	As noted, if PAP is false, the Traditional Argument for Incompatibilism is unsound:

(1)	Someone is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise (PAP).




(3) If determinism is true, no one is ever morally responsible for what she has done.

To meet Frankfurt’s challenge to (1), incompatibilists have often observed that much depends on whether Jones’s action originates deterministically or indeterministically. If the action originates deterministically, they reason, they are within their rights (qua incompatibilists) to deny that he is morally responsible for it. If, on the other hand, it originates indeterministically, then it seems that Jones will have some room for departure from the actual course of events (enough, at least, to trigger Black’s intervention); and this remaining “leeway” can be used to support the Traditional View. This is because, for all Frankfurt has shown, Jones’s responsibility may well depend on this remaining leeway.​[5]​ If so, PAP or a replacement principle (one that doesn’t require any more leeway than is available to Jones) may be true after all. Or so incompatibilist defenders of the Traditional View have often argued.
Steward (2009, 72) terms her proposed replacement principle ‘the Principle of Non-performance’:

(PPN)	A person is morally responsible for a particular action only if he could have refrained from performing it.

In presenting this principle, her aim is twofold. The first is to avoid an influential criticism of several other replacements for PAP.​[6]​ What distinguishes PPN from these other principles is that it doesn’t associate moral responsibility with the ability to do something else (or to do something that would absolve the agent of his actual responsibility). Indeed, it doesn’t require that the agent could have done anything (in the sense of performing a “positive” action) at all.​[7]​ It requires only that it be within his power not to have acted as he did. As noted, questions can be raised about whether PPN genuinely fares better than its predecessors, but I shall not pursue these questions here.​[8]​
Steward’s second objective is to show that PPN serves to anchor a promising variant of the Traditional Argument for Incompatibilism. I shall now argue that her way of defending this principle actually compromises that objective.
According to Steward, PPN has a powerful and distinctive source of support available to it (84):

…[I]t is by no means obligatory to think of PPN as justified [by appeal to the same moral intuitions that support other replacement principles]. One might rather rely on what is I think the equally powerful thought that…a (particular) action qualifies as an action in the first place (and therefore as a candidate for something for which an agent might be morally responsible) only if it something from which an agent is able to refrain. Moral responsibility is only at issue, in the first place, presumably, in connection with scenarios in which it is indeed clear that an agent has truly acted and so that there really is an action for the agent to be responsible for. And a genuine action, the thought is, might require that an agent possess, in respect of it, what I shall call the power of particular refrainment—i.e. the power not to have brought about that very action…Actions can be characterized as essentially the exercises of a two-way power—to  or not—and if they are thus characterized it becomes impossible to suppose that any action could have occurred which could not have been refrained from by its agent.

Suppose we are at an auction and we see Bill’s hand go up. As I understand Steward’s suggestion, the event-token that we describe as ‘Bill’s raising his hand’ is, in fact, an act-token (of the raising-one’s-hand type) only if it was within Bill’s power to have avoided performing that act-token—that is, to have refrained from that particular act of raising his arm. Undoubtedly, Bill’s arm went up in any case, but whether he can be said to have raised it depends on whether it was within his power not to raise it then.
	If the Avoidability Thesis—that performing a particular action depends conceptually on the ability not to perform it—is correct, Steward maintains, PPN is safe from Frankfurt’s challenge. For in that case, Jones can be said to act in the actual sequence only if he has the power in that sequence to refrain from the particular action he performs; and if he has this power in the actual sequence, we don’t have a counterexample to PPN.
But why think that he has this power in the actual sequence? According to Steward, as long as Jones’s action is causally undetermined in the actual sequence, it’s within his power to trigger Black’s intervention, with the result that Black will compel him to exhibit the same type of behavior he exhibits in the actual sequence. And, the thought continues, in the event that Black intervenes, Jones will be compelled to exhibit this behavior. Thus, in the alternative sequence, Jones lacks the power to refrain from exhibiting that behavior. For this reason, his alternative-sequence “action” is an action in name only (given the Avoidability Thesis), and thus cannot be identified with his actual-sequence act-token (ibid.).​[9]​ While Jones is morally responsible in the actual sequence despite lacking the power to do something else, then, he still has the power to refrain from his action. Thus PPN survives where other replacement principles (ones that associate moral responsibility with the ability to do otherwise, i.e., perform a different, “positive” action​[10]​) have failed. There may be no other, positive action that Jones was able to perform instead, but he was able not to have performed the particular action he did.​[11]​ Or so the argument goes.
I shall now argue that this defense of PPN creates multiple difficulties for Steward’s variant of the Traditional Argument. Here is her variant:

(1)	(PPN) An agent S is morally responsible for her -ing [i.e., for her particular token of the -ing type] only if she could have refrained from performing it (because only then could it have constituted a true action). (2009, 86; cf. 72)




(3)	Determinism is incompatible with any agent’s ever being morally responsible for any -ing. (Ibid.)

Lurking in this defense of incompatibilism, I submit, is a reductio ad absurdum of the Avoidability Thesis. Assuming that this thesis is correct, we can derive the non-existence of action from the assumption of determinism, together with the premise that determinism renders every actual occurrence unavoidable. (Indeed, this is a consequence that Steward elsewhere appears to embrace.​[12]​) And the consequence that we never act if determinism is true will strike many as absurd. Even if our world is deterministic, it seems clear that some of the things that happen are things we do. If Steward’s defense of the Traditional View implies otherwise, something has gone wrong.
This is the first horn of the dilemma to which I adverted earlier, the implication that we never act if determinism is true. The reductio can be set out as follows:

(1*)	Whether or not determinism is true, individuals sometimes act (some of the event-tokens that occur are act-tokens). (premise)
(2)	If determinism is true, it is never the case that an individual could have refrained from performing a particular action of hers. (premise; also the second premise of Steward’s argument for incompatibilism)
(3*)	An individual acts only if she could have refrained from performing that particular action. (the Avoidability Thesis, assumption for reductio)








(6*)	If determinism is true, individuals never act. (from 3*, 5*)

And, of course, (6*) contradicts (1*).
It might be asked why Steward cannot simply reject (1*), the premise that individuals sometimes act whether or not determinism is true. Even if we’re convinced that we sometimes act (and that it would be absurd to believe otherwise), why think that she is committed to this? The answer is that, even if she is prepared to bite the bullet and reject (1*), we have not been given any reason to bite it with her. Faced with a choice between embracing the possibility that we never act, and rejecting the view of action that forces this possibility on us, the choice is easy: reject the Avoidability Thesis.
The point is not just that compatibilists—the targets of Steward’s argument—are within their rights to reject the claim that we never act if determinism is true (as indeed they are). The point is that most of us who are not committed compatibilists (and presumably even many committed incompatibilists) will boggle at the idea that we’ve never done anything if our world is deterministic (as for all we know it is). Indeed, this suggestion is much stronger and more counterintuitive than the incompatibilist’s conclusion, (3), that determinism precludes morally responsible action. For this reason, even if the Avoidability Thesis, if true, supports PPN (Steward’s first premise), and even if her two premises (PPN; nobody can refrain from performing a particular action if determinism is true) jointly entail (3), we do not have a promising defense of (3). Without a powerful reason to entertain (6*) (that we never act if determinism is true), we should reject the conjunction of

(2)	If determinism is true, it is never the case that an individual could have refrained from performing a particular action of hers; and
(3*)	An individual acts only if she could have refrained from performing that particular action (the Avoidability Thesis),

the statements that jointly imply (6*). Finally, since (2) is a premise of Steward’s argument for incompatibilism, while (3*) provides the crucial support for her argument’s other premise (namely 1/PPN), Steward has not provided a viable defense of incompatibilism. The Traditional View has been preserved at the expense of the Traditional Argument.
	I have argued that we should reject the Avoidability Thesis before accepting the incompatibility of determinism with action. Steward acknowledges that more needs to be said in defense of the Avoidability Thesis (85):

I cannot hope, within the confines of this paper, fully to defend the metaphysical view of actions on which PPN is based against all the objections that might be brought to bear against it…I concede that a full-blown defense of PPN requires more argument than I am able to offer here.

It seems to me, however, that the above objection is a particularly serious one, and it isn’t clear how it might be answered. So far as I can tell, Steward’s defense of the Avoidability Thesis consists of arguing that it withstands Frankfurt-style counterexamples,​[13]​ and that some prominent early modern compatibilists (along with Aristotle) have appeared to endorse it. Even if she is right on both counts,​[14]​ we have not been given a philosophically compelling reason to entertain this thesis. Of course, this is not to deny that such a reason might be available.​[15]​ But until we are told what it is, the Avoidability Thesis cannot be expected to bear the weight Steward’s argument for incompatibilism places on it.
	But, it might be suggested, even if Steward’s response doesn’t get the desired traction with compatibilist opponents of the Traditional View, perhaps it is still serviceable to some incompatibilists defenders of this view, namely ones who don’t find it absurd to suppose that we never act if determinism is true. As long as it provides these incompatibilists with a rationale for the Traditional View (as embodied in PPN) that they consider acceptable, the suggestion is, they can continue to use Steward’s version of the Traditional Argument in a “defensive” capacity—not to persuade compatibilists, but to show why they needn’t be persuaded by compatibilists.
	Even this more modest agenda turns out to be problematic, for two reasons. First, by accepting that we never act if determinism is true, these incompatibilists would render the Traditional View and the Traditional Argument otiose. This is because we can derive incompatibilism directly from the claim that we never act if determinism is true, assuming that there is no moral responsibility unless there is moral responsibility for actions. (PPN doesn’t figure in this derivation, nor would it yield any additional traction with compatibilists.) Second, if someone maintains that, strictly speaking, we never act under determinism, it’s reasonable to ask her whether we still exhibit voluntary and intentional behavior under determinism. If so, it might be argued that, pace Steward, we are sometimes morally responsible for the voluntary and intentional behavior we are causally determined to exhibit (as when such behavior isn’t compulsive, delusional, based on factual error, and so on), even if such behavior doesn’t count as action. In that case, the important question might come down to whether an analog of PPN—to the effect that someone is morally responsible for act-like voluntary and intentional behavior only if she was able to avoid exhibiting that particular behavior—succumbs to Frankfurt’s challenge. If, on the other hand, someone denies (or “denies”) that we exhibit such behavior under determinism, I am not sure what to say (or “say”). Beyond failing to gain traction with compatibilist opponents, then, the Traditional Argument, so defended, doesn’t provide incompatibilists with a satisfactory, “defensive” rationale for their position.
	Summing up, the initial promise of Steward’s response to Frankfurt fades when we combine the Avoidability Thesis with the second premise of her argument for incompatibilism. For this conjunction—that all actions are avoidable, and that nothing causally determined is avoidable—generates the seemingly absurd consequence that we never act if determinism is true. And a defense of the Traditional Argument that has this consequence shouldn’t persuade compatibilists (or the rest of us). Because it has this consequence, Steward’s defense of (her version of) the Traditional Argument succumbs to the dilemma’s first horn.
	Still, it might be asked whether there is any reason to suppose that causally determined “actions” are actions in name only. To motivate this view, it might be maintained that we are, in some interesting sense, passive with respect to what we are causally determined to do, if the ultimate causes of our actions are external to us. If such passivity excludes genuine action, there is reason to think that determinism’s truth precludes genuine action. While this is an intriguing thought, it fails to provide us with a compelling reason to believe that our ordinary attributions of action would be systematically false under determinism. After all, most of the events we normally consider actions are based on agents’ mental states, including beliefs, desires, and intentions; moreover, we believe that many such events would be defective as actions (if they qualified as actions at all) if such mental states didn’t play an appropriate role in their causal histories. If, for example, the occurrence described by ‘Jones’s finger’s squeezing the trigger’ were not a response to Jones’s beliefs and desires concerning the effects of this occurrence, it would be, at best, a very strange case of performing the act of pulling the trigger. And, the thought continues, it’s hard to see why the causal relationship’s being deterministic should lead us to deny that the squeezing of the trigger is something Jones does. (It is much more natural to say that it is something he must do, given the deterministic relationship, than to deny that it’s something he does at all.) Perhaps there is some respect in which the deterministic relationship renders Jones passive, but such passivity won’t lead us to reclassify Jones’s deed as a mere happening—not as we normally understand action. Nor should it, given that the behavior in question is a voluntary and intentional response to Jones’s reasons for exhibiting it. Perhaps incompatibilists are right to deny that Jones is morally responsible for what he has done; but, again, that is a separate question from whether he has done it.
What about the claim that it isn’t a full-blown action, or that it lacks some active quality, a quality that it might have if Jones weren’t causally determined to perform it? While this suggestion is intriguing as well, we would need to hear more about this active quality, why exactly it’s incompatible with determinism, and hinges on its presence. Without answers to these questions, we do not have good reason to doubt that we perform full-blown actions whether or not determinism is true.​[16]​
 
3.	Alvarez and the Dilemma’s Second Horn
	Let us turn now to Alvarez’s response to Frankfurt. As noted, this response employs the same basic materials as Steward’s. These include a principle linking moral responsibility for an action with the power to refrain from that action, and an attempt to support that principle by appeal to the Avoidability Thesis.
I shall now argue that Alvarez’s version of the strategy avoids the first horn of the dilemma (the implication that we never act if determinism is true) at the cost of landing on the second (the implication that causally determined actions are avoidable). To begin, let us note a terminological difference between Steward and Alvarez. Whereas Steward replaces PAP with PPN, a principle that explicitly mentions refraining, Alvarez retains PAP, but construes this principle in such a way that the power to refrain from one’s action is sufficient for the ability to do otherwise (even if the agent is unable to perform a different “positive” action) (2009, 63). On this liberal reading, PAP is equivalent to PPN.
In the previous section, we saw that an important part of Steward’s defense of PPN is her claim that Jones has the power (in the actual sequence) to refrain from his action because that action (= act-token) is absent from the alternative sequence (where Jones cannot be said to act at all). To recall, Steward’s basis for this claim is that, in rendering Jones’s behavior unavoidable, Black compromises Jones’s status as the agent of that behavior. Alvarez defends this claim in a similar way, though her emphasis is somewhat different. In particular, whereas Steward accepts Frankfurt’s stipulation that Jones’s alternative-sequence behavior is unavoidable and so seeks to disqualify it as an action, Alvarez argues, in effect, that it will be hard to maintain that this behavior is truly unavoidable without impugning its status as an action.
Return to the actual sequence in Frankfurt’s scenario. If the challenge to PAP is to succeed, Alvarez observes, there must be some action such that, in the actual sequence, Jones is both morally responsible for, and unable to avoid, performing it. But, she asks, what justifies the claim that Jones’s action is strictly unavoidable? The mere fact (if it is a fact) that he will perform this action “no matter what” won’t do the trick; for we cannot validly infer ‘Jones can’t avoid doing ’ from ‘Jones won’t avoid doing .’ To support the stronger claim, Alvarez concludes, Black must be able to make it the case that, by virtue of his intervention in the alternative sequence, Jones cannot refrain in that sequence from doing —that is, Black’s intervention must be “irresistible” (67).
	But here, she believes, a problem arises (ibid.):

It should be noted here that it is not legitimate for a Frankfurt-style case simply to stipulate that, in the counterfactual case, the agent would be caused to perform an action he cannot avoid performing…Rather, any example needs to tell a compelling story that makes the suggestion plausible without begging the issues at hand. For the idea that this possibility is conceptually unproblematic is by no means self-evident:…the concept of what performing an action is makes the cogency of this idea at best highly dubious.

Specifically, Alvarez wishes to deny the legitimacy of stipulating that Jones’s action in the alternative sequence is unavoidable simply because Black causally determines its occurrence. To render Jones’s behavior unavoidable, she maintains, Black must render it irresistible, and it’s not clear that a piece of behavior that meets this condition can be considered an action. (More about this soon.) If Jones cannot be said to act at all in the alternative sequence, his action in the actual sequence cannot be identified with his alternative-sequence behavior; and so that action won’t qualify as unavoidable. It thus appears that Frankfurt’s stipulation that Jones’s alternative-sequence behavior is both an action and unavoidable is more contentious than has been realized.
	But is Alvarez right about this? It seems to me that much depends on the specific dialectical context(s) between Frankfurt and his actual opponent(s). My interest here is in the context between Frankfurt and incompatibilist defenders of the Traditional Argument. In this dialectical context, the stipulation that Black’s intervention renders Jones’s alternative-sequence action unavoidable seems innocuous. For if incompatibilists didn’t accept this, they would be in no position to maintain the second premise of the Traditional Argument, that determinism precludes avoidability. If Jones’s alternative-sequence action is avoidable despite Black’s deterministically causing him to perform it, why not think that ordinary causally determined actions meet the relevant standard of avoidability as well? If so, the Traditional Argument collapses.​[17]​
	It should be emphasized that Alvarez is not concerned (as Steward is) with defending the Traditional Argument (62):

My own arguments are not motivated by any position in the debate about the compatibility of free will/moral responsibility and determinism. Rather, I wish to highlight and challenge an assumption that underlies all Frankfurt-style cases and show that, given the concept of what it is for someone to perform an action, that assumption is untenable.

As I have argued, however, this assumption is tenable in the context of the debate between Frankfurt and incompatibilist defenders of the Traditional Argument.​[18]​
Notice that if Alvarez were to deny that Jones acts in the alternative sequence because his behavior, being deterministically caused, doesn’t count as an action, we would be back on the dilemma’s first horn, the implication that determinism precludes action. It seems clear, however, that this is not the way she wants to go.​[19]​ Her considered view seems to be, rather, that genuine unavoidability requires more than mere causal determination; it requires irresistibility of a particularly strong sort (74-75):
	
…Perhaps there are inclinations to do something that cannot literally be resisted, but then the inclination is not a “desire,” and the resulting behavior often hardly qualifies as an action of which one can be said to be the agent, instead of a reaction, a reflex movement, or even a bodily function.

But what about ordinary, causally determinative mental states, of the sort that normally produce human behavior on the assumption that determinism is true? Suppose that Black were to bring about Jones’s action in the alternative sequence by inducing a strong desire to act—a desire that, in conjunction with Jones’s other mental states at the time, deterministically produced his action in the alternative sequence. As noted, our incompatibilist cannot deny that Jones’s behavior is an action simply because it is deterministically caused by his mental states, on pain of returning to the dilemma’s first horn. Nor can she maintain that his action is avoidable because (though it is causally determined) it isn’t literally irresistible, for that would land her on the second horn, implying that (merely) deterministic actions are avoidable (so that the Traditional Argument collapses). Putting these points together, our incompatibilist isn’t in a position to challenge Frankfurt’s description of Jones’s behavior in the alternative sequence as an unavoidable action. In this dialectical context, Frankfurt’s stipulation seems innocent enough.
Summing up, while it’s certainly legitimate for Alvarez to take up Frankfurt’s challenge without any particular agenda regarding the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists, it’s another matter entirely if her response has no application within that debate. I have argued that it isn’t available to defenders of the Traditional Argument, for it preserves the argument’s first premise only by sacrificing the second. In saying that Jones is morally responsible in the alternative sequence, where Black impels him to act, incompatibilists would be conceding that deterministic actions as such are not unavoidable, thereby encountering the second horn of the dilemma. While I have not tried to show that this response is off limits to compatibilist defenders of the Traditional View (who reject the Traditional Argument’s second premise), these compatibilists may want to think twice before embracing the view that no genuine action is ever irresistible in a responsibility-compromising way.

Concluding Remarks
	I have not directly challenged the thesis that there cannot be unavoidable actions. Instead I have examined the implications of the Avoidability Thesis in connection with the question whether causally determined actions are avoidable. If such actions are avoidable, the Traditional Argument for Incompatibilism fails. If such actions (or “actions”) are unavoidable, and if the Avoidability Thesis is true, the claim that we sometimes act hinges on the status of determinism; and defenders of the Traditional Argument cannot afford to maintain this. If I am right, the Avoidability Thesis fails to provide a promising response to Frankfurt’s challenge to the Traditional Argument, whether we take causally determined actions to be avoidable or unavoidable.
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^1	  I would like to thank John Fischer for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees for the Canadian Journal of Philosophy for detailed feedback and for suggestions that resulted in improvements to the manuscript.
^2	  In what follows, ‘compatibilism’ names the thesis that the truth of causal determinism is compatible with the existence of moral responsibility (whatever the case may be about the compatibility of determinism with “the freedom to do otherwise”), and ‘incompatibilism’ the opposing thesis about determinism and moral responsibility.
^3	  As we shall see in due course, Alvarez is not concerned (as Steward is) with securing an effective argument for incompatibilism. Still, if her response is unavailable to one side in the debate—the side that arguably has the most to gain from it—this is worth knowing.
^4	  While most contemporary compatibilists have rejected the Traditional View, usually on the basis of Frankfurt’s challenge, a few have resisted this challenge, maintaining instead that causally determined actions meet the relevant standard of avoidability (thus challenging the Traditional Argument’s second premise). See Berofsky (1997); Campbell (1997, 2005); Fara (2008); Smith (2003); Vihvelin (2004).
^5	  The idea that Jones’s moral responsibility depends on this leeway has been developed in two main ways. One involves arguing (roughly) that Jones could have tried, begun, or shown an inclination to do otherwise, or that he could have avoided performing the action on his own, if his action had originated indeterministically; and that his responsibility depends on this leeway (which would have been absent under determinism). Versions of this approach can be found in McKenna (1997); Naylor (1984); Otsuka (1998); van Inwagen (1983); Wyma (1997). The second approach involves arguing that Jones retained the ability to make a different decision about what to do, even if Black wouldn’t have let him execute that decision; and that our decisions are the principal loci of responsibility. See Ginet (1996); Kane (1985, 51), (1996, 142-43, 191-92); Widerker (1995). Steward’s (2009, 70-72) aim is to improve upon earlier versions of the first approach.
^6	  See note 5.
^7	  Steward (2009, 78) leaves it open whether refraining should be considered a type of action. While this is a substantive question, nothing in the present dialectical context depends on how we answer it. As long as we can intuitively distinguish acts of refraining from “positive acts” (or acts of omission from acts of comission), we can state Steward’s view as the position that someone can be morally responsible for a positive act even if no other positive act was available to him. For convenience, I will reserve ‘action’ for positive acts. However, this is merely a terminological choice, and it need not prevent us from supposing that there are (negative) acts of refraining.
^8	  Elsewhere I argue that the Steward-Alvarez strategy succumbs to a variant of Fischer’s influential objection to these earlier responses to Frankfurt’s challenge (Shabo, manuscript.) See especially Fischer (1994, ch. 7), (1999).
^9	  According to Steward (2009, 84), an advantage of her approach over some other responses to Frankfurt is that it avoids messy questions about act-individuation. Since there is no act-token in the alternative sequence, her opponent cannot maintain that the behavior that Black produces in the alternative sequence is the same act-token that Jones performs in the actual sequence. Be this as it may, analogous questions about event-individuation may remain, since it might be maintained that Jones’s action in the actual sequence isn’t essentially an action, and that it is token-identical to his (passive) behavior in the alternative sequence. (I offer this as an observation, not an objection.)
^10	  An example of such a replacement principle is Wyma’s “Principle of Possibly Passing the Buck”: “A person is morally responsible for something she has done, A, only if she has failed to do something she could have done, B, such that doing B would have rendered her morally non-responsible for doing A” (1997, 59). This principle is naturally read in such a way that ‘A’ and ‘B’ stand for (positive) actions. For discussion of Wyma’s approach, see Steward (2009, 70-71).
^11	  A key claim for Steward is that Jones retains the power to refrain from the action he actually performs, as opposed to there being the mere possibility of his not performing that action. I’m not convinced that she has supported this claim, for reasons I explain in Author (under consideration), in the context of a broader discussion of the counterexample strategy.
^12	  She writes: “Where I differ from Fischer is only in my insistence that the question what does happen in the actual sequence is not independent of the question whether the agent has any alternative possibilities—for unless she possesses the power to refrain from the particular action she undertakes, I maintain, the actual sequence cannot constitute the occurrence of an action.” See Steward (2008, 144). Fischer (2008, 170) responds by observing that, just as Frankfurt cases can be used to challenge PAP, so they can be used to challenge the Avoidability Thesis.
^13	  But, cf. Fischer (2008, 170).
^14	  It appears that, pace Steward, the passages she cites from Hume and Hobbes concern the conditions for free action (or “liberty”), not action simpliciter (2009, 79). 
^15	  An anonymous referee has suggested a defense of the Avoidability Thesis that involves (a) linking the power to act with the power to do otherwise (where this presumably includes the power not to act as one has), and (b) linking such “active powers” (which include both the power to perform and to refrain from a particular action), in turn, with counterfactual powers, powers entailed by facts about the actual causal relations between act and agent. I find this suggestion intriguing, and would welcome a response to my argument in terms of it. However, this response is beyond the scope of this paper. (Such a defense of the Avoidability Thesis would have much in common with Campbell’s (2005) interesting compatibilist response to Frankfurt.)
^16	  Thanks to the journal’s editorial board for suggesting that I consider more directly the question of whether a causally determined event could qualify as an action, independently of whether an avoidable event could so qualify. 
^17	  As noted, whereas Steward’s objective in defending PPN is to preserve a viable argument for incompatibilism, Alvarez (2009, 62) seeks a defense of PAP that is neutral with respect to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. (See note 3.) My contention is that this defense is unavailable to incompatibilists. Furthermore, there is at least a question about whether compatibilists can readily adopt this defense, for reasons we shall come to shortly.
^18	  Is the assumption tenable outside of this context? It seems to me that the answer is “yes.” To repeat, Alvarez’s basis for denying that Black can cause Jones to perform an unavoidable action is that only irresistibly caused behavior is unavoidable, and that such causation precludes action. Why not think, though, that some putatively compulsive behaviors (e.g. ones symptomatic of severe addictions and phobias) are actions, albeit unavoidable ones? Without a compelling reason to set the bar for irresistibility/unavoidability so high—a reason Alvarez does not provide—the assumption that Black can cause Jones to act via an irresistible desire seems eminently defensible. It is worthy of note that compatibilists who have resisted Frankfurt’s challenge have not rejected the possibility of compulsive, responsibility-undermining action. See, for example, Fara (2008, 858-60), and Smith (2003, 18).
^19	  It must be conceded that there are some passages in which this is not entirely clear, as when she writes, “It would not be enough [to ensure unavoidability] if the background conditions were such that Black would merely cause Jones to perform the action, for this would merely sanction the conclusion that Jones would have performed the action either way...” (2009, 69, first italics added). And, “So, for a Frankfurt-style cases to succeed as a counterexample, it is necessary that in the counterfactual case Black would determine that Jones performs the action” (ibid., italics original).
